入学試験問題（1次）

外国語

平成27年1月26日 13時10分—14時10分

注意事項

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2. この冊子は、17ページである。落丁、乱丁、印刷不鮮明の箇所などがあった場合には申し出よ。
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No.  

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◇M3(147—51)
1. 次の英文を読み，1 ～ 8 の問題に最も適した答えを選べ。

Precarity is a word of the times. Picked up first by European social and labor movements in the 1970s, precarité indexes shifted in late stage capitalism toward more flexible, contingent, and irregular work. At its base, precarity refers to conditions of work that are precarious; precarious work is "employment that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky from the point of view of the worker" (Kalleberg 2009). By this definition, most work for most workers around the world has been historically precarious, which makes precarity less the exception than the rule. Half of all workers in the world today work in the informal economy that is, by definition, precarious. And in the United States most jobs were precarious and most wages unstable until the end of *the Great Depression. But, in the case of the United States, the government stepped in, *bolstering social protections and creating jobs with *the New Deal. And as *Fordism took hold and unions (and workers’ rights to collectively bargain) strengthened, regular full-time jobs — and access to the middle class — became the norm by the 1950s. In those developed countries that, like the United States, enjoyed a period of postwar Fordism that accorded its worker citizens (in the core workforce at least) secure employment, it is the *deviation from this norm that the term precarity (and the “precariat” as the precarious proletariat of irregular workers) in large part refers. Precarity references a particular notion of, and social contract around, work. Work that is secure; work that secures not only income and job but identity and lifestyle, linking capitalism and *intimacy in an affective desire for security itself. Precarity marks the loss of this — the loss of something that only certain countries, at certain historical periods, and certain workers ever had in the first place.

Japan was one of those places. What it had before, and what has become of this in the precaritization of labor and life in the last two decades, is the issue of concern. Precarious Japan, a country struck by a radical change — in
socioeconomic relations in post-war times—that conveys, and gets commonly interpreted as, a national disaster. And this even before the Great East Japan Earthquake and accompanying tsunami pounded the northeast coast of the country on March 11, 2011, rendering it a “gooey wasteland of death and debris. This crisis *oozed mud that *literated a muddiness existing already. But not only mud. The tsunami triggered a meltdown in the Daiichi Nuclear Plant in Fukushima that *spewed radiation. It was a nuclear disaster *reminiscent of the dropping of the atomic bombs that ended the Second World War and killed upwards of one hundred forty thousand at Hiroshima and eighty thousand at Nagasaki in August 1945—a reminder of Japan’s unique history as the first, and only, country to be the victim of nuclear warfare.


And in “embracing defeat” under the occupation of *Allied (mainly American) forces, Japan entered its postwar period of astounding reconstruction, achieving high economic growth and astronomical productivity in record time.

Nuclear radiation and mud. A strange combination that mixes histories as well as metaphors. For if the disaster at the Daiichi nuclear reactor in Fukushima provoked memories of Japan’s victimization and vulnerability at the end of the Pacific War—and the *eerie risk of an unknowable, invisible contamination—the sea of mud that *pummeled what had been solid on the coastline signaled something else: a liquidization in socioeconomic relations that started in the mid-1990s (but actually before) with the turn to flexible employment and its transformation of work and the workplace. This is called ryūdōka in Japanese—the liquidization or flexibilization of work and life. In liquefied Japan a change in the logic of work seeps into everyday relationality: relations once valued for their sturdiness in space (staying in the same company or neighborhood for decades) and durability over time (lifelong marriages, group memberships, and jobs). Sociality today has become more *punctuated and *unhinged. Along with replaceable work and workers is the rhythm of social
impermanence: relationships that instantaneously connect, disconnect, or never start up in the first place. One-third of all Japanese live alone these days and the phenomena of both NEET (not in education, employment, or training) and hikikomori (social withdrawal) are well known among youths. As I’ve learned in the process of fieldwork in summers since 2008, many Japanese feel lonely, that they don’t belong (anywhere), and are struggling to get by. A recent special on public television *encapsulated current conditions of social life with the label “muen shakai”—the relationless society.

Much of what I track about precarity involves pain, but this is not all I have learned or come to understand about precarious Japan. For, if hope is the vision of the future in a state of becoming, I see signs of not only hopelessness but also of people struggling to make Japan a place where fewer will fall prey to precarious lives (and ungrievable deaths). Few of these people care for the word hope, I discovered. But in trying to survive a condition of precarity that is increasingly shared, one can see a glimmer in these attempts of something new: different alliances and attachments, new forms of togetherness, do-it-yourself ways of (social) living and revaluing life. One can sense, if one senses optimistically, an emergent potential in attempts to humanly and collectively survive precarity: a new form of commonwealth (commonly remaking the wealth of sociality), a biopolitics from below. This social and political possibility I call the soul on strike in precarious Japan.

[Source: Ann Allison, Precarious Japan, Duke University Press, 2013, pp. 6–8, 17–18]

Glossary:

the Great Depression：大恐慌 bolstering：～を支える
the New Deal：ニューディール政策
Fordism：ベルトコンベアなどによる大量生産を可能にした生産システム
deviation：逸脱 intimacy：親密さ gooey：どろどろした

— 3 —
ooze (d)：にじみ（あぶれ）出させる literalize (d)：文字通りに実現する
spew：吐き出す reminiscent：～を連想させる，思い起こさせる
Allied (mainly American) forces：（アメリカを主体とした）連合軍
eerie：薄気味の悪い pummel (ed)：衝突すること
punctuate (d)：～を中断させる unhinge (d)：ぐらつかせる
encapsulate (d)：要約する
ungrievable deaths：悲しむ人のいない死（孤独死）
glimmer：わずかな兆し
biopolitics：「生政治」。人々の生活を規律的に拘束する見えない権力のこと

1. 下線部(1) precarity の本文中における意味として最も近いものを一つ選べ。
   A. meaninglessness
   B. progressiveness
   C. instability
   D. inflexibility

2. A～Dの単語の最も強いアクセントのある母音が、下線部(2) economy の最も強いアクセントのある母音と同じものを選べ。
   A. consumer
   B. contrast
   C. condition
   D. economical

3. 下線部(3) accorded の意味に最も近い単語を一つ選べ。
   A. gave
   B. identified
   C. deprived
   D. cooperated
4. 下線部(4)の a muddiness existing already という語句が表わしている内容に最も近いものを一つ選べ。
A. the abnormal aspects of human nature
B. the traditional socioeconomic relations
C. the social protections and creating jobs
D. the liquidization of society

5. 下線部(5)の括弧内の和文に対応する英文を、以下の括弧内の語句から完成した場合に、17番目にあたる語を選び。
[an, ambitions, Asia, Atomic, bombs, domain, East, Japan's, wound, ended, left, render, militarist, unbearable, imperial, its, but, also, to]
A. domain
B. its
C. militarist
D. ended

6. 下線部(6) signaled の文中における意味と同じものを一つ選べ。
A. called
B. canceled
C. transformed
D. suggested

7. 下線部(7) a new form of commonwealth の意味する内容に最も近いものを一つ選べ。
A. a new type of precarity
B. an enhanced biopolitics
C. another sort of social liquidization
D. a social connectivity in the new era
8. 本文の論旨に最も近いものを一つ選べ。

A. 米国では“precariat”の存在が、大恐慌からの経済回復を確実なものとしていた。

B. 職業生活の安定性が見られたのは、人類史上例外的な一時期に過ぎない。

C. 古来職業というものはある安定してきたが、近代になって不安定となった。

D. 戦後日本の高度経済成長を支えたのは、社会の流動性であった。
Economists and psychologists have spent decades studying the relation between wealth and happiness, and they have generally concluded that wealth increases human happiness when it lifts people out of poverty and into the middle class but that it does little to increase happiness thereafter. Americans who earn $50,000 per year are much happier than those who earn $10,000 per year, but Americans who earn $5 million per year are not much happier than those who earn $100,000 per year. People who live in poor nations are much less happy than people who live in moderately wealthy nations, but people who live in moderately wealthy nations are not much less happy than people who live in extremely wealthy nations. Economists explain that it hurts to be hungry, cold, sick, tired, and scared, but once you've bought your way out of these burdens, the rest of our money is an increasingly useless pile of paper.

So, once we've earned as much money as we can actually enjoy, we quit working and enjoy it, right? Wrong. People in wealthy countries generally work long and hard to earn more money than they can ever derive pleasure from. This fact may be puzzling. After all, a rat can be motivated to run through a maze that has a cheesy reward at its end, but once the mouse is full, then even the finest cheese won't get him to move. Once we've eaten our fill of pancakes, more pancakes are not rewarding, hence we stop trying to consume them. But not so, it seems, with money. As Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, wrote in 1776: "The desire for food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach; but the desire of the conveniences and ornaments of building, dress, and household furniture, seems to have no limit or certain boundary."

If no one wants to be rich, then we have a significant economic problem, because flourishing economies require that people continually acquire and consume one another's goods and services. Market economies require that we all
have *insatiable hunger for stuff, and if everyone were content with the stuff they had, then the economy would grind to a *halt. But if this is a significant economic problem, it is not a significant (15) problem. *The chair of the Federal Reserve may wake up every morning with a desire to do what the economy wants, but most of us get up with a desire to do what we want, which is to say that the fundamental needs of a lively economy and the fundamental needs of a happy individual are not necessarily the same. So what motivates people to work hard every day to do things that will satisfy the economy’s needs but not their own? Like so many thinkers, Adam Smith believed that people want just one thing—happiness—hence economies can blossom and grow only if people are deceived into believing that the production of wealth will make them happy. If and only if people hold this false belief will they do enough producing and consuming to sustain their economies.

The production of wealth does not necessarily make individuals happy, but it does serve the needs of an economy, which serves the needs of a stable society, which serves as a network for the *propagation of false beliefs about happiness and wealth. Economies succeed when individuals strive, but because individuals will only work for their own happiness, it is essential that they mistakenly believe that producing and consuming are routes to personal well-being.


Glossary:

insatiable: 飽くことを知らない  halt: 止まる
the chair of the Federal Reserve: 連邦準備制度（米国の中央銀行制度）理事会議長  propagation: 広まること
9. What does the word (9) flourishing mean?
   A. superior
   B. abundant
   C. prosperous
   D. bargaining

10. What does the word (10) deceived mean?
    A. negotiated
    B. forced
    C. brought
    D. fooled

11. What does the word (11) strive mean?
    A. try hard
    B. grow
    C. steer
    D. realize
12. Why are people who live in moderately wealthy nations not less happy than people who live in extremely wealthy nations?
A. Because the experience of being hungry, cold, sick, tired, and scared is about the same in both types of nations.
B. Because in both types of nations money is an increasingly useless pile of paper for people who are hungry, cold, sick, tired and scared.
C. Because people in both types of nations have enough money to avoid being hungry, cold, sick, tired and scared.
D. Because in both types of nations, money is not essential for people who are hungry, cold, sick, tired and scared.

13. According to Adam Smith, why is the desire for money greater than the desire for food?
A. Because there is a limit for consuming food but not for goods and services.
B. Because the desire for conveniences may have boundaries.
C. Because people desire the convenience of goods and services more than food.
D. Because desire for food is not as rewarding as the desire for money.

14. Why is there a significant economic problem if no one wants to be rich?
A. Because happiness cannot be achieved from a rich economy.
B. Because economies are successful when goods and services are continually consumed.
C. Because people are less motivated by the goods and services of an economy.
D. Because the economy depends on goods and services customers produce.
15. Choose the word that best fits ( 15 ) to complete the sentence.
   A. political
   B. technological
   C. cultural
   D. personal

16. What motivates people to work hard to do things that will satisfy the economy's needs?
   A. The belief that consuming promotes personal growth
   B. The belief that a good economy serves a stable society
   C. The belief that becoming rich will make them happy
   D. The belief that personal wealth serves the economy
Some Americans see Japanese businessmen as robot-like workaholics who live in little rabbit *hutches and think of nothing but the steadfast pursuit of economic superiority for their companies and "Japan Incorporated." Conversely, some Japanese see American businessmen as *overbearing, selfish, lazy *oafs who sit around all day complaining about unfair business practices, yet are unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices to make their companies and the American economy successful. There may even be some Japanese and American businessmen who fit this pattern, but the great majority certainly do not. Consequently, this generalization really does not fit reality. Understanding Japanese or American culture is not dependent on identifying "typical" Japanese or Americans because there are really no such things.

Generalizations of people and cultures usually result in oversimplified, and often negative, stereotypes. While we most often think of ourselves as individuals, we tend to see others as representatives of groups. This is a natural tendency because, given the enormous complexity of our social environment, we must see the world in patterns in order to make sense out of it. We wouldn't be able to deal with the daily *onslaught of people, information, and objects if we couldn't predict a lot about them and feel that we know who and what they are. Stereotypes reduce the threat of the unknown by making the world more predictable, which is indeed one of the basic functions of culture: to lay out a predictable world in which the individual is firmly oriented.

When we deal with foreigners or travel to foreign lands, stereotypes may be psychologically necessary to reduce the ambiguity and sense of helplessness that may result from our inability to understand and deal with situations beyond our control. But they can also be dangerous because many times they hinder our ability to analyze situations or people objectively. Understanding culture means understanding fundamental underlying patterns that can be used as a basis for
handling particular situations; it does not depend on developing oversimplified stereotypes.

Cultural patterns and orientations reflect the complex interplay of values, attitudes and behaviors displayed by members of a given society. Cultural diversity exists within and between cultures, but within a single given culture certain behaviors are favored while others are repressed: “The norm for a society is the most common and generally accepted pattern of values, attitudes and behavior. The term cultural patterns describes the attitudes of most of the people most of the time, not all of the people all of the time” (Adler, International Dimensions of Organizational Behavior).

Words such as “all,” “always,” and “never” usually indicate a generalized and should not be used when making cultural observations. When Japanese say, “You Americans always...,” we often become irritated. Such seemingly innocuous generalizations may be offensive to Americans because they do not take into account the fundamental emotional underpinnings of our culture, which emphasizes integrating people with diverse cultural backgrounds and ways of doing things into the fabric of American society. Generalizations about “typical” American behavior may also make Americans uncomfortable because of the American emphasis on.

Cultural stereotypes are very dangerous because many times people will behave according to their preconceived stereotypes of others without taking into account other variables. An American researcher reports on “habits” that may irritate Americans and Japanese when they interact with each other. Many of the “habits” do indicate deep cultural differences, but they are often oversimplified into negative cultural stereotypes. When people think and behave based on stereotypes, without a deeper knowledge of the underlying cultural foundations, negative judgments, evaluations, and outcomes often ensue.

It is human nature to view behavior that we don’t understand or thinking that is different from our own in negative terms. Inevitably, Americans will
judge some Japanese behavior as inappropriate, wrong, or abnormal, not just
different from the American way of doing things or thinking. Again, this is
perfectly normal, and Japanese will do the same when they encounter American
behavior or thinking that they don’t understand.

Cultural relativism as illustrated by the axiom “different ways of doing
things are just different” is nice in theory, but the ideal of limitless tolerance
often proves to be a fragile illusion in real life. It may be relatively easier for the
Japanese to adhere to the proverb “When in Rome do as the Romans do” because
of a cultural predisposition toward situational ethics than it is for Americans,
who tend to believe that ethics are universal. A Japanese sociologist was quoted
in an American news magazine as saying that the Japanese have no principles.
She didn’t mean anything negative, but was merely observing that in many cases
Japanese behavior is determined by the dictates of the situation as opposed to a
universal standard of morality or truth. The Japanese are very familiar with the
English expression “case by case” because it is very applicable to their way of
thinking.

[Source: Gregory R. Tenhover, Unlocking the Japanese Business Mind,

Glossary:
hutch: (小動物用の)かご, 獸 (おり) Japan Incorporated: 日本株式会社
overbearing: 高圧的, 横柄な
oaf: (からだはばり大きくて役に立たない)無骨者, うどのだ木
onslaught: 猛威, 殺到 innocuous: 無害の
underpinnings: 基礎, 基盤 predisposition: 傾向, 性質
17. Generalization of cultures _______.
A. is necessary to understand and appreciate cultures deeply
B. often leads to negative cultural stereotypes
C. is essential when we discuss and understand primitive cultures
D. makes our understanding of cultures more difficult

18. Stereotypes can _______.
A. simplify the complexity of a culture so we can appreciate it more deeply
B. help us better deal with unknown situations
C. make things more manageable by seeing them objectively
D. make our distant future more predictable and unstable

19. Cultural stereotypes are dangerous because they often _______.
A. lead to racial confrontations
B. prevent us from understanding our own culture
C. make people behave based on other cultural values
D. end up with negative results

20. According to the author, Americans will judge some Japanese behaviors as inappropriate because _______.
A. Americans believe in universal religion
B. the Japanese have no moral principles
C. Japanese ethics depend on familiar situations
D. they are different and Americans don’t understand them
21. Cultural relativism is ________.
   A. easier to understand than to put into practice
   B. to make a judgment on other cultures based on universal ethics
   C. not to change one's values and behavior in different cultures
   D. not to tolerate other cultures limitlessly

22. 本文中にある A ～ D の単語の最も強いアクセントのある母音が、下線語【pattern】の最も強いアクセントのある母音と同じものを選べ。
   A. determine
   B. attitude
   C. function
   D. environment

23. 空所 ( 23 ) に入る最も適切な語を選べ。
   A. vague
   B. complex
   C. positive
   D. false

24. 空所 ( 24 ) に入る最も適切な語を選べ。
   A. religion
   B. individuality
   C. cosmopolitanism
   D. groupism
25. 本文の表題として最も適切なものを選べ。

A. How to appreciate stereotypes to understand cultural patterns and intercultural communications more deeply
B. How to understand the functions of stereotypes and generalizations to prevent us from oversimplifying other cultures and people
C. How to avoid oversimplification and negative stereotyping to make one's own culture more attractive and understandable
D. How to respect other cultures to make the world a better place